



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
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
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***Israel - Arab States:** Israeli Defense Minister Dayan's announcement yesterday that steps will be taken to turn the Gaza Strip into a part of Israel increases the pressure on Egypt and the other Arab states to negotiate a settlement.

By moving toward formal annexation of the area, Israel, as it did in Jerusalem, is confronting the Arabs with the possibility of permanent absorption of occupied territories if they do not agree to discuss the future status of these areas. The Israelis had earlier indicated that separation of the Palestinian Gaza Strip from Egyptian control--it formerly was not part of Egypt proper but was "administered" by Cairo--would be one of their primary objectives in any postwar settlement.

The Gaza Strip's population of 400,000 includes more than 300,000 refugees from the 1948 Palestine War. Dayan, in his announcement, said that beginning next week Gaza inhabitants will be allowed to move freely inside Israel under permits granted by the military government, and that there will be regular transportation to and from the town of Gaza. A curfew will remain in effect. Dayan earlier had approached United Nations authorities about transferring some of the Gaza refugees to evacuated UN camps on Jordan's West Bank.

The fact that Dayan, and not the Israeli Foreign Ministry, made the announcement appears to be a further indication of his prominence within the Israeli cabinet. While he presumably is speaking for the government, his position on the future of occupied territories has been noticeably tougher than Foreign Minister Eban's. Prime Minister Eshkol, for his part, reportedly has been upset over Dayan's penchant for publicity and for taking action in certain instances without checking with him first.

In Jordan, Prime Minister Juma yesterday publicly reiterated his government's determination to regain control of the West Bank. The day before, Juma had told the US chargé d'affaires privately that, while two weeks ago

there had been some talk on the West Bank of creating a separate political entity through independent Palestinian negotiations with Israel, only a few Palestinian leaders now were willing to support this concept.

The last governor of Jordanian Jerusalem has expressed his disillusionment about prospects for such negotiations, according to the US Consulate General in Jerusalem. The ex-governor said he had changed his opinion after observing Israel's administration of the Jordanian sector. [redacted]

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*United Nations: Attempts are still being made to retrieve something positive from the General Assembly's emergency session on the Middle East, which recessed last night until 12 July.

Before the assembly reconvened yesterday, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin approached Ambassador Goldberg and suggested a 48-hour break to allow another effort to find a compromise between the two defeated resolutions. Dobrynin was told that the chances for agreement on anything much beyond a procedural proposal did not seem very great.


Several of the area groups which have been active during the session also met privately yesterday to consider the possibilities for some more constructive outcome. One idea reportedly advanced is a Swedish proposal that the assembly reaffirm previous cease-fire resolutions and take some step leading to the appointment of a UN representative in the Middle East.

The last-ditch efforts--which may or may not be successful--are evidently being encouraged by a variety of considerations. The US Mission believes the Soviets fully realize they suffered a severe setback in this week's voting and are chastened by it. There evidently is also considerable concern in New York that the UN has been hurt both by the bitter debate and by the lack of useful results.

Arab moderates have reportedly also been warning that they will be in a poor position to cope with pressure from the radicals--even advancing the argument that they will be better off if the UN requests the Arab countries to carry out some specific action.

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Congo (Kinshasa): The widespread and perhaps coordinated outbreaks of mutiny in eastern Congo could be almost impossible for the Mobutu government to combat.

White mercenaries and Katangan troops who mutinied on 5 July quickly gained control of Bukavu after only sporadic fighting. The mutinous soldiers seem to be friendly toward the local civilian population and foreigners; no Americans have been injured although evacuation plans are being made. Congolese Government reports indicate that Congolese National Army units in Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville) also are under attack and are not doing well. Communications with Punia, Kindu, Goma, and Shabunda are out, and these cities may have been taken.

The Mobutu regime will find it very difficult to regain control. The army has few capable units in the eastern Congo, and it is doubtful if any of these would be willing to move against the mercenaries. Furthermore, the army has no means to transport troops rapidly in any numbers.

The background of the mutiny is not known, but it may have been triggered by the recent kidnaping of former Premier Tshombé, who still is detained in Algiers. A mercenary officer in Bukavu told the American consul that the mutiny had been planned in advance and that the mutineers would soon be joined by Tshombé's own forces. These troops, the mercenary said, are to arrive from outside the country momentarily, but these claims have not been confirmed.

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Communist China - Burma: Peking is maintaining its pressure against Burma in the aftermath of anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon.

On the diplomatic front, China continues its efforts to offset last week's humiliation of Chinese in Rangoon at the hands of Burmese demonstrators. On 4 July, Peking asked Rangoon to permit Chinese aircraft to take Overseas Chinese injured in the riots back to China for medical treatment. The Foreign Ministry repeated earlier demands that Rangoon publicly apologize to the Chinese Government and prevent the recurrence of anti-Chinese incidents.

For the first time in many years, Peking's propaganda is proclaiming support for the Burmese Communist party's struggle against the "reactionary" Ne Win regime. This propaganda may be backed up by small-scale material and financial support for the Burmese Communist forces, but it is unlikely that Peking will go much beyond this effort.

[redacted]

Korea: The continuing high level of Communist armed harassment of South Korea probably is intended to aggravate political tensions in the South and to expand future subversive activity there.

The domestic opposition to President Pak Chong-hui's government has claimed that sending Korean troops to Vietnam endangers South Korea's security. Pyongyang may believe that armed harassment will strengthen critics of Pak and discourage the deployment of additional South Korean troops to Vietnam.

North Korean armed reconnaissance and probing activities in the area of the Demilitarized Zone have risen sharply this year. Most of the incidents have been concentrated in the US sector of the DMZ, but in the last few weeks attacks against South Korean personnel have risen. Growing South Korean losses could provoke military commanders to retaliate, despite UN Command orders against such action.

In addition, Pyongyang has stepped up the infiltration of agents into the South. As many as 60 heavily armed men in nine teams are believed to be operating in remote eastern and southern areas of South Korea. Their mission is to recruit Communist sympathizers and to establish operational bases for future guerrilla activity. Information from captured agents and defectors shows that Pyongyang has expanded and improved its agent training program and is capable of turning out about 500 agents annually.

The South Koreans have organized special mobile teams to deal with the situation. Some 10,000 military and civilian security personnel are involved in efforts to track down and destroy those agent teams already active in the country.

France: The rigid French position on safeguards is raising new obstacles to the nonproliferation treaty.

Paris has made it clear that it will not become a party to any EURATOM arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the application of safeguards. The French say they will not object if any of the other five members enter into bilateral arrangements with IAEA for acceptance of safeguards, but will not accept EURATOM jurisdiction in this matter.

France also will not accept IAEA inspection of any facilities on French territory, including those owned by EURATOM or owned jointly by France and another EURATOM member.

Paris thus appears to be obliging the Five to choose between the IAEA system and the EURATOM system. Confronted with such a choice, the Germans and others would be more reluctant to sign the nonproliferation treaty. [redacted]

NOTES

Britain-Aden: The British Army's recapture of part of Aden's Crater district should ease tensions and give London more time to try to get dissident groups into a transitional government. The operation was nearly bloodless, suggesting the existence of an agreement between the British and leaders of the South Arabian Army and the police, whose loyalty has been in question. British officials also may finally have made contact with leaders of one or both of the major Adeni nationalist groups, whom the British want to bring into a new government. [redacted]

Mexico: Elections last Sunday for seven state governorships and the lower house of congress gave the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) its traditional overwhelming victory. Early official returns show the PRI winning even in the border state of Sonora, where popular opposition to the ruling party candidate resulted in military intervention in May. The opposition National Action Party, which campaigned vigorously in Sonora in the hope of attracting the disaffected PRI vote, is claiming fraud. [redacted]

[redacted] Official results of the election are not expected before next week.

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